Journal of Financial Crises
Volume 3

Issue 1

2021

Lessons Learned: Chester B. Feldberg
Maryann Haggerty

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises
Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, Economic History Commons, Economic Policy Commons,
Finance Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, Infrastructure Commons, Insurance
Commons, Macroeconomics Commons, Other Political Science Commons, Political Economy Commons,
and the Public Affairs Commons

Recommended Citation
Haggerty, Maryann (2021) "Lessons Learned: Chester B. Feldberg," Journal of Financial Crises: Vol. 3 : Iss.
1, 509-511.
Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol3/iss1/17

This Lessons Learned is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Financial Crises and
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact
journalfinancialcrises@yale.edu.

Yale Program on Financial Stability
Lessons Learned
Chester B. Feldberg
By Maryann Haggerty
Chester B. Feldberg worked for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) for 36 years in
a variety of roles. In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, he served as a trustee for the
AIG Credit Trust Facility (2009-2011). The Trust was established in early 2009 to hold the
equity stock of American International Group Inc. (AIG) that the U.S. government had received
as a result of the 2008 AIG bailout. The three trustees were responsible for voting the stock,
ensuring satisfactory corporate governance at AIG, and eventually disposing of the stock.
When he was named as a trustee, Feldberg was retired. Immediately previous, he had been
chairman of Barclays Americas (2000-2008). He had retired from the Federal Reserve System
in 2000. At that time, he was executive vice president of the Bank Supervision Group. Earlier, he
ran the FRBNY’s discount window, and worked on teams involved with several financial system
crises. This “Lesson Learned” is based on an interview with Mr. Feldberg.
Each crisis is different, so do whatever it takes.
During his career with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Feldberg had hands-on
experience in how the government handled a string of high-profile crises. But in his view, the
Global Financial Crisis eclipsed them all. He said:
My view is that the 2007-2008 crisis was much larger and more dangerous than all of
the other crises I talked about, on a combined basis. In fact, I have told people that I
was happy that I was retired by the time the 2007 crisis developed, because there was
a lot of uncertainty as to how and whether it was going to be effectively resolved. I
don’t see how the experiences with the earlier crises would have helped us get
through 2007-2008.
To my mind, that crisis confirmed my long-held view that when the financial system
is in serious danger of implosion, the Fed and the Treasury will have to do whatever
it takes to manage the crisis. This, as it happened, involved thinking out of the box and
without regard to the constraints of past precedent. That process may not have been
pretty, and it may not have been perfect, but I think it's clear that it did save the day.
Holding equity helped the government make the best of the AIG bailout.
Feldberg came out of retirement in 2009 to take a position as a trustee of the AIG Credit
Facility Trust, the entity that held the AIG common stock the government received in return
for rescuing the insurance company. The Trust was charged with voting the stock, ensuring
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satisfactory corporate governance at AIG, and eventually disposing of the stock. Some prebailout stockholders sued, taking their fight all the way to the Supreme Court, but they lost.
Holding the stock gave the government influence over AIG in the years following the rescue,
Feldberg said.
Now, the shareholders obviously weren’t happy with having to give away 80 percent
of the company in order to get federal government support, but what got pointed out
to them on many occasions is that, they may have lost 80 percent of the value, but if
the government hadn't stepped in, they would have lost 100 percent. My view was
that the government needed to offer tough love to AIG. It was seeking a huge amount
of money. I thought that the precedential implications of the arrangement could come
back and bite the government in the future, unless the terms of the agreement were
such that future companies would be discouraged from seeking federal help, except
in the most dire of circumstances.
I can understand why [former AIG chairman and CEO] Hank Greenberg and the other
shareholders didn’t like it. I can understand why the shareholders didn’t like the
terms of the government’s deal. But from the government’s standpoint, it gave the
government a tool and a lever to influence as necessary the decisions being made by
the company and to protect the taxpayers’ investment.
The trustees proved their independence.
Some critics in Congress and elsewhere questioned how independent the trustees were from
the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve System. But Feldberg said that despite the
close relationships he and his colleagues kept up with their government counterparts, they
maintained their independence. “We wanted to make it clear at the outset that we expected
to operate independently and not as a rubber stamp for decisions made by the Federal
Reserve or the Treasury Department,” he said. As an example, he pointed to the search for
new members of the AIG board of directors. The trustees had hired a headhunter,
interviewed candidates, and put together a list of six people who would be qualified and
willing. He recalled:
Before going forward, really as a courtesy, but just in case they knew something we
didn’t know, we circulated the names to the Fed and the Treasury. … While the Fed
came back with no suggestions, the Treasury came back with six new names to
replace the six names we had come up with. I mentioned earlier the process we went
through to come up with those names. It was very intense, it was very serious, and it
was very productive. As I recall, the Treasury’s names for the most part, were former
Treasury officials at below top levels. They were proposed not because of their
background in divestment scenarios, not because of their compensation experience,
not because of their accounting background, not because they were capable of
becoming chairman of the board if a need arose, but apparently because these were
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people known to the Treasury. We rejected all six names and went with the six names
that we had. If that’s not independence, I don’t know what independence is.
In retrospect, the Trust structure may not have been necessary.
The AIG Credit Facility Trust was established, Feldberg said, because the Government did
not want to hold the AIG stock directly “because of concerns about the appearance or the
reality of conflicts of interest.” He added, “It was certainly the more cautious way to proceed,
but was it the necessary way to proceed? I don’t know. I didn’t really think about it at the
time. They said conflicts of interest and I thought, ‘bad thing.’”
The Trust held 80 percent of AIG’s stock. In a later phase of the bailout, the Treasury
Department acquired another 8 percent. As a result, Feldberg said:
You now had equity stock in AIG being held for the benefit of the government by two
different groups, the Trust and the Treasury Department. … If the Treasury
Department could hold 8 percent of the equity stock without a conflict of interest,
why couldn’t it hold 88 percent? Is the critical difference that in the latter case it
would have been the majority shareholder? Maybe so, but I guess all I’m saying is that
if a way could have been found for the Treasury and/or the Fed to hold the stock
during the period of the financing of AIG, that would have eliminated the need for a
third player in the process. Even if we didn’t have our own cast of thousands, we were
still doing a lot of work and had a lot of ideas and interfacing with the Fed, the
Treasury, AIG, just adding a further complication to the process.
I think that the trustees made a contribution, particularly with getting AIG’s
governance on a better footing, but I have no reason to think that the Fed or the
Treasury couldn’t have gotten to the same point. So that’s a long way of saying that if
you could get over the potential conflict of interest hurdle, I’m not sure you needed to
have another player in the process. But that’s my own personal view, and I haven't
really spent a lot of time thinking about all of the implications.
_______________________________________
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